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Abstract 
Computer-based interviewing systems could use models of respondent disfluency behaviors to 
predict a need for clarification of terms in survey questions. We compare simulated speech 
interfaces that use two such models—a generic model and a stereotyped model that distinguishes 
between the speech of younger and older speakers—to several non-modeling speech interfaces in 
a task where respondents provided answers to survey questions from fictional scenarios. Our 
modeling procedure found that the best predictor of conceptual misalignment was a critical 
Goldilocks range for response latency, outside of which responses are more likely to be 
conceptually misaligned. Different Goldilocks ranges are effective for younger and older 
speakers. 
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1 Introduction 
Let’s say you’re cooking spaghetti in the kitchen and the phone rings and before you know it you’ve 
agreed to answer some questions in a survey interview. The interviewer asks you, “How many hours per 
week do you usually work at your job?” As a corporate lawyer who aspires to be a professional chef, your 
answer is potentially elaborate. You get paid for making calls and eating lunch and playing golf, and you 
might say you’re working even now, practicing for your next career. But instead of going into all that, 
you find yourself saying, “Well… uh… usually seventy.” 
What are you up to? You’ve made a guess about what you think the interviewer is getting at, while 
recognizing that your own concept of “work” or “job” or “usually” might be different. That is, you’ve 
recognized the possibility of conceptual misalignment (Schober, 1998). And instead of giving an 
elaborate answer that would defy Grice’s (1975) cooperative principle—which sees to it that we don’t say 
much more about things than we think we need to for the task at hand—you answer based on that guess. 
But at the same time, you’ve laid your own awareness of possible conceptual misalignment out on the 
table for the interviewer to note, using subtle signals that indicate things may not be so straightforward: 
you hedge (“well”), you pause (“…”), and you insert a filler (“uh”) before you answer, all of which are 
disfluent behaviors that can signal when a speaker has a problem (Brennan & Williams, 1995; Schober & 
Bloom, 2004; Smith & Clark, 1993). We’ll call these signals misalignment cues.  
So communication happens on two planes: on one plane you answer the question you think is being 
asked, providing information that attends to the task at hand, while on another plane you send out some 
misalignment cues that manage possible subtasks of the dialogue, signaling misalignment information 
that may or may not be so important but is subtly offered in case it proves relevant (Bangerter & Clark, 
2003). Now it’s up to the interviewer to catch on to those signals and decide if she wants to pursue that 
misalignment problem further. 
But the interviewer’s recognition of your misalignment problem is by no means assured, partly 
because people speak disfluently for all kinds of reasons, and partly because she brings her own 
expectations to the dialogue about what that disfluency might mean. If you’re very far into the interview 
and you’ve said “well” and “uh” in every answer, by now the interviewer may have decided you’re just a 
person who says “well” and “uh” a lot, and may not infer any misalignment at all. That is, she creates an 
individualized model of your disfluency behaviors, and may only infer misalignment when those 
behaviors deviate from her expectations according to that model. Or, even if this is the first question in 
the interview, she might bring some established assumptions—a stereotyped model—that shape her 
expectations about your speech. Did we mention yet that you’re 76 years old? And since older speakers 
are known to be more disfluent (Schow et al., 1978; Shrivastav et al., 2003; Yairi & Clifton, 1972), and 
interviewers act differently with older respondents compared to younger ones (Bradburn et al., 1979), she 
may be working from a model that tells her that your hedging and pausing and fillering do not indicate 
any misalignment problem at all, unless your use of those cues deviates from the stereotyped model that 
shapes her idea of how seventy-something-year-old people should speak. 
In short, we can speculate that misalignment cues are overdetermined and that, like words in general, 
their interpretation requires a dynamic and interactive process, inasmuch as that interpretation depends on 
the expectations—or speaker models (Schober & Brennan, 2003)—that people bring to a dialogue.  
This overdetermination poses a problem for anyone who might have the idea of using these 
misalignment cues to try to automatically diagnose conceptual misalignment problems in survey 
interviews. Could a machine algorithm listen for certain misalignment cues and then offer clarification of 
key words like “work” or “job” when it hears those cues? Or would it be better if that machine were also 
tuned in to other aspects of the interaction that people often pay attention to, such as the age of the person 
it’s talking with (using a stereotyped model of misalignment cues), and changed its expectations 
accordingly? 
After all, telephone interviewers of the future may well consist of machine speech interfaces that 
recognize respondents’ unconstrained speech, and working dialogue systems that conduct interviews are 
already in use (Blyth, 1997; Cole et al., 1994). But if they are to be as effective as human interviewers, 
these machines would need to detect and predict cases of possible conceptual misalignment, where 
respondents need clarification of concepts in a question. Clarification has been shown to improve 
comprehension—and thus data quality—in survey interviews (Conrad & Schober, 2000; Schober & 
Conrad, 1997; Schober, Conrad & Fricker, 2004). Ideally, that clarification would be targeted and offered 
only when necessary, without being an intrusive burden, perhaps by modeling expectations about the 
speaker’s needs. Our purpose here is to explore how that process of modeling and targeting might work in 
automated speech survey interfaces, comparing the effectiveness of a generic model of misalignment cues 
(that treats all respondents the same) to a stereotyped model (that distinguishes respondents by age 
group), and also comparing these modeling procedures to interfaces that rely on other criteria to address 
problems of conceptual misalignment. 
2 Experimental Method and Results 
To identify possible misalignment cues in answers to survey questions and derive models that could then 
be tested for their effectiveness at identifying cases of conceptual misalignment, this study was divided 
into two phases: (1) a model-derivation phase that collected data that were used to create and validate 
generic and stereotyped models, and (2) a model-implementation phase that tested implementations of the 
models derived from the first phase on a new set of respondents. These phases consisted of five 
conditions: three in the model-derivation phase, and two in the model-implementation phase. Since all 
five conditions were similar, we’ll first look at the overall design, and then at the methods and results of 
each of the two phases. 
2.1 Overall Design 
Participants completed a referential communication survey task similar to the design used by Schober and 
Conrad (1997), answering a selected set of twelve survey questions from existing, ongoing U.S. 
government surveys. Rather than responding about their own lives, they responded about fictional 
scenarios so the accuracy of their answers could be determined. And rather than being interviewed by a 
person, participants answered questions presented by a computer over a standard telephone. All 
participants were asked the same questions, though scenarios varied in terms of how well potentially-
ambiguous concepts in the scenarios mapped onto the questions asked. The method by which participants 
received clarification about those potentially-ambiguous concepts also varied, constituting five 
experimental conditions: (1) a baseline, no clarification condition where no clarification was provided, 
(2) a respondent-initiated clarification condition where clarification was provided only when explicitly 
requested, (3) a required clarification control and validation condition, where clarification was provided 
for every question, (4) a generic respondent model condition where clarification was provided on request 
and also provided automatically from a “generic respondent misalignment” model, and (5) a stereotyped 
respondent model condition where clarification was provided on request and also from a “stereotyped 
respondent misalignment” model that distinguished between older and younger respondents. In the 
model-derivation phase, measures of potential misalignment cues taken from responses in the no 
clarification condition and the respondent-initiated clarification condition were used to derive models 
developed for the two modeling conditions, and measures from responses collected in the required 
clarification condition were used to validate those models. In the model-implementation phase, these two 
models were then tested using the generic respondent model and stereotyped respondent model 
conditions. 
Participants. 100 participants were divided into two age groups and randomly assigned across the five 
conditions, with 10 participants per group per condition. Participants were assigned to groups by age: one 
group of 50 participants over the age of 65 constituted an “older” group, and the other group of 50, 
younger than age 40, constituted a “younger” group. Genders were balanced across conditions, with 5 
males and 5 females from each age group participating in each condition, and all were native English 
speakers. 
Questions and Scenarios. Each participant was asked to answer twelve survey questions taken from 
ongoing survey interviews conducted by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in three different 
domains: Four questions about housing came from the Consumer Price Housing Index survey (e.g., “How 
many people live in this house?”), four questions about work situations came from the Current Population 
Survey (e.g., “How many hours per week do you usually work at your job?”), and four questions about 
purchases came from the Current Point of Purchase Survey (e.g., “Have you purchased or had expenses 
for household furniture?”), all of which have been used in earlier studies (e.g., Schober & Conrad, 1997). 
For each question, survey designers at BLS had already developed official definitions for key concepts 
designed to clarify whether, for example, a “floor lamp” should be counted as a piece of “household 
furniture,” which helped us to infer whether a participant’s understanding of the key concept in a question 
matched the intended definition—that is, it allowed us to measure conceptual alignment between the 
participant and the question designer. 
The official definitions sounded something like this: “Let me give you our definition of household 
furniture. Include tables, chairs, footstools, sofas, china cabinets, utility carts, bars, room dividers, 
bookcases, desks, beds, mattresses, box springs, chests of drawers, night tables, wardrobes, and 
unfinished furniture. Do not include TV, radio, and other sound equipment, lamps and lighting fixtures, 
outdoor furniture, infants' furniture, or appliances.” 
Participants answered these questions while looking at fictional scenarios in which the key concepts 
were manipulated so the response accuracy of participants’ answers could be used to infer conceptual 
alignment. Each question had two alternate scenarios: either a straightforward mapping where the 
description in the scenario mapped onto the key concept of the question in a clear and simple way, or a 
complicated mapping where the description in the scenario mapped onto the question in a way that was 
more open to interpretation, making it hard to answer correctly without information about the official 
definition of the key concept. For example, a participant who is asked “Has Kelly purchased or had 
expenses for household furniture?” might see a straightforward scenario that showed Kelly’s receipt for 
the purchase of an end table—which most people would interpret as household furniture—or instead 
might see a complicated scenario with a receipt for a floor lamp, which some may interpret as household 
furniture, even though the official definition states that floor lamps should not be counted. Half of the 
scenarios seen by each participant were straightforward mappings, and half were complicated mappings. 
Procedure. Participants sat at a desk in a laboratory with a packet of scenarios and a regular Bell-style 
telephone and were asked to dial a number when they felt familiar enough with the scenarios to answer 
questions about them. Though participants were told they would be interviewed by a computer, the 
number they dialed was actually answered by a computer in the next room that was controlled by an 
experimenter, who used a Wizard-of-Oz telephony interface to present the questions and reply to the 
participants’ answers using a synthesized text-to-speech voice.  
In the no clarification condition, participants heard a question, provided an answer, and immediately 
moved on to the next question. In the respondent-initiated clarification condition, participants were told 
they could ask for clarification of terms if they felt like they needed it. If they asked for clarification, the 
synthesized voice read them the official definition of the key concept, and then asked the question again. 
In the required clarification condition, clarification was provided for every question. After participants 
answered a question they automatically heard the scripted definition and were presented with the question 
a second time, allowing them to change their answers if they wished. Finally, in the generic respondent 
model and the stereotyped respondent model conditions, respondents answered the question and were 
then given clarification if the misalignment cues in their initial answers met the criteria of the respondent 
models for that condition, followed by a chance to answer the question a second time. 
2.2 Model-Derivation Phase 
The model-derivation phase collected the data needed to derive and validate the models used in the 
modeling conditions of the second phase. It consisted of the no clarification, the respondent-initiated 
clarification, and the required clarification conditions. Data from the no clarification and respondent-
initiated clarification conditions were used to create models of the behaviors that best predicted 
conceptual misalignment, and the required clarification condition was used to validate those models.  
Predictors Used. To derive the models, the following misalignment cues immediately following each 
question were pooled from responses in the no clarification and the respondent-initiated clarification 
conditions and tallied for use as potential predictors: length of response latency in milliseconds from the 
end of the question to the beginning of an answer, fillers, hedges, restarts, repeats, repairs, reports, and 
mutters. The criteria for coding these behaviors were adapted from Bortfeld et al. (2001). 
One other potential cue was added early in the experiment after participants were seen performing a 
consistent behavior we had not considered: While most answers were straightforward and unelaborated 
(such as “yes” or “fifty”), some responses also repeated a word or words from the question that had just 
been asked that often included the key concept word(s). This behavior can be seen as a joint action (à la 
Clark, 1994) that “picks up” any potentially-ambiguous words from a question and “keeps them in play” 
in the dialogue, allowing them to be confirmed and negotiated further by both parties.  
Consider the question, “How many hours per week does Mindy usually work at her job?” A response 
like “fifty” does not invite any further negotiation of the terms of the question, and does not offer any 
recognition that the word “usually” is open to interpretation. However, a response like, “Usually, fifty” 
picks up the term “usually” as a way of keeping it in play so it can be confirmed or negotiated. Such 
behavior may show some awareness for the respondent that a concept is open to interpretation. We could 
call this behavior a referential confirmation pick-up; or more simply, a confirmation pick-up. 
The cues mentioned above (response latency, fillers, hedges, restarts, repeats, repairs, reports, 
mutters, and confirmation pick-ups) were all used as predictors to derive models of misalignment profiles 
for both the generic and the stereotyped modeling conditions, using an ordinary least squares regression 
to determine the best predictors of conceptual misalignment, inferred through response accuracy (A) as 
the criterion variable. The regression equation for each model began with factors for response latency (L), 
fillers (F), hedges (H), restarts (RS), repeats (RP), repairs (RA), reports (RO), clarification requests 
(CR), repeat requests (RR), confirmation pick-ups (CP), and mutters (M), creating the following least-
squares equation: 
A =  β1 L + β2 F + β3 H + β4 RS + β5 RP + β6 RA + β7 RO + β8 CR + β9 RR + β10 CP + β11 M  + e 
Coefficients (β) for each of these potential cues were determined that yielded the smallest residual 
constant (e) and factors were eliminated using backward variable elimination. 
Age Group Differences in Disfluency Rates. The first question we asked was whether there were indeed 
significant differences in disfluency rates between the two age groups. Findings from the first two 
conditions reveal that older participants were in fact more disfluent than younger ones, in keeping with 
previous findings (Bortfeld et al., 2001; Schow et al., 1978; Shrivastav et al., 2003; Yairi & Clifton, 
1972). When compared to the younger group, the older group provided significantly more fillers 
(F(1,478) = 6.47, p = .011), restarts (F(1,478) = 6.13, p = .014), repeats (F(1,478) = 20.55, p < .001), 
repairs (F(1,478) = 5.47, p = .02), reports (F(1,478) = 15.50, p < .001), repeat requests (F(1,478) = 10.35, 
p = .001), and mutters (F(1,478) = 9.31, p = .001). 
Response Latency and the Goldilocks Ranges. Against expectation, the raw measure of response latency 
initially did not show any correlation with accuracy (e.g., longer latencies predicting greater inaccuracy), 
and it did not show significant differences between age groups. A closer look at the data suggested that 
responses to complicated mappings that were too fast were often as likely to lead to inaccurate responses 
as responses that were too slow, leading to a critical range of latency that is “just right” for predicting 
when people may provide an accurate response, but outside of which they are more likely to provide an 
inaccurate one. That range can be thought of as a Goldilocks range for response latency as a predictor of 
accuracy. 
Goldilocks ranges for the models were derived and tested by finding the latency ranges that yielded a 
maximal adjusted R2 for each first-pass regression model using all predictors. When our initial response 
latency predictors were replaced with variables that specified whether the latency of a response fell 
outside the Goldilocks ranges, these models yielded better predictions of accuracy than a single-threshold 
generic model (adjusted R2 of -.041, p = .610) in both the generic (adjusted R2 of .003, p = .454) and 
stereotyped (adjusted R2 of .212, p = .048) cases.  
The Goldilocks range determined from responses from all participants without regard to age group 
yielded a range between 2 and 7.2 seconds, which is a range that can be used to help derive a generic 
model. Analysis of the two age groups using two independent Goldilocks factors (one for younger 
respondents and another for older) revealed a Goldilocks range of 4.6 to 10.2 seconds for the younger 
group, and 2.6 to 4.35 seconds for the older group. While these two stereotyped ranges bring to light a 
clear difference between how the two groups answer questions, they do not support the prediction that 
“older people take longer to answer” in general. Rather, the response latency range in which older people 
can be expected to provide a conceptually aligned answer is attenuated, and also shifted to a much faster 
response time than we see for the younger group (perhaps indicating that older respondents apply a 
different kind of knowledge or answering strategy). 
Generic and Stereotyped Models. Multiple-pass regression analyses of all potential predictors showed 
that in fact a participant’s failure to respond within the response latency Goldilocks range proved the 
single significant predictor of inaccurate responses for both the generic model and the stereotyped model. 
Confirmation pick-ups surfaced as the second-most enduring predictor in both regression models, though 
they predicted accurate responses rather than inaccurate ones. At p = .15 in the generic and p = .23 in the 
stereotyped model, confirmation pick-ups did not reach the criterion of significance to be included in the 
final regression, though a repeated measures analysis showed confirmation pick-ups as predictive of 
accurate answers for older respondents, F(1,38)=5.28, p = .027, and also predictive of complicated 
mappings for both age groups, F(1,38)=4.90, p = .033. 
So our models of both the generic and the stereotyped cases used only the Goldilocks range factors to 
predict conceptual misalignment. Responses that fell within that range were more likely to be aligned and 
did not warrant offers of clarification, while responses falling outside the range were more likely to be 
misaligned, and therefore warranted clarification. 
Validation of Models. Because the required clarification condition solicited two responses from 
participants—one that came before the participant heard clarification and one that came after—this 
condition provided an ideal platform to test our models on an independent data set, since we knew how 
respondents would have answered both with and without clarification. For the generic model, when 
participants made an inaccurate response, the model predicted 53.3% of these as responses that came 
either too slow or too fast. The stereotyped model predicted 83.3% of participants’ inaccurate responses. 
But would these validation results extend to actual implementation of the models? That question could 
only be answered experimentally. 
2.3 Model-Implementation Phase 
The model-implementation phase implemented and tested the derived generic and stereotyped models. It 
consisted of the generic respondent model and the stereotyped respondent model conditions. 
Response Accuracy. Do models that use generic or stereotyped Goldilocks ranges actually help to reduce 
conceptual misalignment and improve response accuracy when compared to the other non-modeled 
conditions? The short answer is that they do: both modeling conditions result in significantly higher 
accuracy on complicated mappings than not modeling at all, with modeling conditions showing accuracy 
ratings that are reliably on-par with providing clarification for every question. 
While overall mean accuracy for complicated mappings was only 52%, the differences in response 
accuracy for complicated mappings varied greatly by condition, as shown in Figure 1. Though 
respondents reliably differed in response accuracy by condition [F1(4,95) = 35.87, p < .001; F2(4,55) = 
19.40, p < .001], this effect shows a significant difference only between the respondent-initiated 
clarification condition and the generic respondent model condition. With no clarification at all, accuracy 
on complicated mappings reached only 20%. When participants were allowed to ask for clarification, 
accuracy rose to a somewhat higher 28%, F1(1,95) = 1.46, p = n.s.; F2(1,55) =.80, p = n.s.  
But for the generic modeling condition where all participants were offered clarification according to 
the same Goldilocks range, accuracy on complicated mappings reached a reliably higher 64%, F1(1,90) = 
35.03, p < .001; F2(1,55) = 19.09, p < .001. And when different Goldilocks ranges were tailored for the 
respective younger and older groups, accuracy in the stereotyped condition reached 72%, F1(1,90) = 
1.46, p = n.s.; F2(1,55) =.80, p = n.s. The highest accuracy on complicated mappings came when all 
participants heard clarification every time, at 77%, which was not reliably different from accuracy in the 
stereotyped condition, F1(1,90) = .65, p = n.s.; F2(1,55) = .35, p = n.s. Although these accuracy rates for 
the generic respondent model, the stereotyped respondent model, and the required clarification 
conditions do not differ significantly from each other, they do reflect a significant linear trend, F1(1,90) = 
128.10, p < .001; F2(1,55) = 68.89, p < .001, in which the higher rates of clarification afforded by 
increasingly fine-tuned modeling (or from providing clarification for every question) lead to higher 
accuracy. 
Not surprisingly, and consistent with prior findings (Schober & Conrad, 1997; Schober, Conrad & 
Fricker, 2004), participants fared very well overall at answering questions to straightforward mapping 
scenarios (mean accuracy of 94%), which varied little across conditions and age groups.  
While stereotyped modeling did not lead to reliably better overall response accuracy on complicated 
mappings than generic modeling, there was a marginal difference by age group by participant, F1(1,90) = 
3.49; F2(1,110) = 2.58, p = n.s., where older respondents fared marginally better from stereotyped 
modeling (see  Figure 2), reaching an accuracy of 75% as compared to only 57% in the generic modeling 
condition, F1(1,45) = 3.79, p = .058; F2(1,55) = 3.79, p = .057. Younger participants, however, fared 
about the same with either type of modeling, reaching 68% accuracy with stereotyped modeling 
compared to 72% with generic modeling, F1(1,45) =.17, p = n.s.; F2(1,45) = .09; p = n.s. There was no 
reliable interaction between age group and condition for all conditions F1(4,90) = .98, p = n.s.; F2(4,110) 
= .73, p = n.s. Older participants did not fare reliably better from receiving clarification every time (in 
fact they appear slightly worse) than they did from stereotyped modeling, with an accuracy of 70%, 
F1(1,45) = .28, p = n.s.; F2(1,55) = .28, p = n.s. And although younger participants fared best in the 
required clarification condition, with an accuracy of 83%, this increase in accuracy was not reliably better 
than accuracy in the generic respondent model, F1(1,45) = 2.08, p = n.s.; F2(1,55) = 1.14, p = n.s., or the 
stereotyped respondent model, F1(1,45) = 3.43, p = n.s.; F2(1,55) = 1.89, p = n.s. 
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Figure 1: Response accuracy by condition for all ages 
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Figure 2: Response accuracy by age on complicated mappings 
 
Time to Answer Each Question. How much time will be added to an interview if these various methods of 
providing clarification are implemented? The general trend was that the more clarification was given, the 
more time it took each participant to get through each question. Question-response sequences went fastest 
when little clarification was given, in the no clarification condition (16.1 seconds for the younger group 
and 19.2 seconds for the older group) and the respondent-initiated clarification condition (younger = 15.0 
secs, older = 20.2 secs). More time was needed per question in the generic respondent model condition 
(younger = 39.4 secs, older = 42.5 secs) and slightly more in the stereotyped respondent model condition 
(younger = 50.0 secs, older = 51.2 secs). The most time was needed in the required clarification 
condition (younger = 60.9 secs, older = 66.1 secs). These differences were reliable by condition, F(4, 84) 
= 173.76, p < .001, and by age group, F(1,84) = 6.95, p = .01, with no significant interaction between the 
two, F(4,84) = .31; p = n.s. As seen in Figure 3, the younger group is consistently faster. Respondents 
took reliably less time to answer questions under the stereotyped respondent model method than they did 
under the required clarification method, F(1,35) = 36.84, p < .001. This difference is worth noting, since 
the earlier comparison of these two conditions showed no reliable difference in accuracy. Respondents 
who received stereotyped modeling were just as accurate as respondents who received clarification for 
every question, but spent significantly less time on each question. 
Respondent Satisfaction Ratings. Regardless of the method used to provide clarification (whether because 
of modeling or simply provided for every question), respondents did not reliably prefer one method over 
another. Overall mean satisfaction was 5.41, with a marginally higher rating coming from older 
respondents (mean of 5.73) than younger ones (mean of 5.08), showing no reliable effect by age group 
(F(1,54) = 2.11, p = n.s.) or condition (F(2,54) = .49, p = n.s.). Satisfaction results are shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 3: Average time to answer each question 
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Figure 4: Respondent satisfaction with clarification 
3 Conclusion 
Our purpose here was to look into exploiting that “second plane” of communication in which signals like 
misalignment cues help to manage the dialogue process, and to see if generic or stereotyped models of 
those signals could help diagnose cases of conceptual misalignment in an automated survey system. After 
deriving both generic and stereotyped models of various misalignment cues, we found the best cue is 
conspicuous in its absence: a critical Goldilocks range in response latency, outside of which people are 
more likely to give conceptually misaligned responses. A generic Goldilocks range of 2 to 7.2 seconds is 
effective at predicting overall levels of conceptual alignment. But that range is more effective when 
tailored for older and younger speakers, where older speakers are less likely to provide a conceptually 
aligned response if their answers do not fall within a range that is briefer and slightly sooner (2.6 to 4.35 
seconds) than the range used by younger speakers (4.6 to 10.2 seconds). 
In a nutshell, “help helps—and tailored help helps better.” Whatever the modeling method, both 
models led to more offers of clarification, and more clarification led to greater accuracy. Whether they 
received this clarification as a result of modeling through the Goldilocks ranges or simply received it for 
every question, respondents were reliably more accurate when given clarification automatically than 
when they were left to ask for it on their own or were not given clarification at all. So help helps, but 
tailored help helps better, since both older and younger age groups were just as accurate under 
stereotyped modeling as when they received clarification every time, yet took reliably less time to answer 
questions in the stereotyped modeling condition. In addition, they were just as satisfied with the 
clarification they received under stereotyped modeling as they were with receiving it every time. 
So it seems expectations about the speech of different types of respondents can be successfully 
modeled to help assess problematic answers to questions or conceptual misalignment in general. And 
computer interviewing systems could be designed to permit flexible interactions that help respondents 
provide data that are in line with the intentions of the question authors. 
On a final note, while older speakers showed more disfluent behaviors than younger speakers when 
verbally answering questions asked by a computer interviewer—using reliably more fillers, restarts, 
repeats, repairs, reports, repeat requests, and mutters—most of these other disfluent behaviors were not 
highly significant predictors in regression models that sought to identify cases of conceptual 
misalignment. Does this mean that these other misalignment cues would not be effective in models that 
seek to predict conceptual misalignment? On the contrary, these other cues could prove much more 
effective if modeled on an individualized, case-by-case basis. Now that we’ve seen that some 
misalignment cues are in fact relative and overdetermined under stereotyped modeling, a real test of that 
idea calls for an interactive and highly-dynamic approach that creates and adjusts its model of a person’s 
style of speech—that is, working from an individualized model—even while that person is still speaking. 
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